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“Out, Damned [Metadata]!”1
By Emily Shaw

I.

Introduction

We live in exciting times; technology is evolving quickly. The legal profession, however,
has a history of begrudging and delayed acceptance of new technology. Attorneys may be
slow to learn new tricks, but when it comes to metadata, the usual reactionary behavior could
be harmful to clients. It is imperative that attorneys understand the ethical and evidentiary
issues that arise when metadata is disclosed, mishandled, discovered, or destroyed. This paper
explores these issues and recommends best practices to avoid inadvertent disclosures and
ethical violations. The structure of this paper is as follows: first, metadata is defined and
explained. Second, I will explain potential harm that metadata can cause. Third, issues of
confidentiality, attorney-client privilege will be explored. Fourth, I will explore some of the
evidentiary concerns regarding discovery and destruction of metadata. Finally, the conclusion
will recommend best practices for new and experienced attorneys to avoid metadata missteps
and manage metadata with confidence.
II.

Metadata Defined

Definitions vary with context and jurisdiction, but simply put, metadata is data about
data. In the legal context, metadata is “all of the contextual, processing, and use information”
associated with an electronic document.2 John Kinas, director of information technology for
the District of Columbia Bar, likened metadata to a price tag on a wedding gift—it’s a very
useful piece of information when you’re buying the gift, but it becomes problematic if you
accidentally leave it on.3 Metadata is useful and necessary for common computer applications.
For example, the ability to ‘undo’ an edit in a Microsoft Word document relies on metadata
that tracks the edit history of the document.4 Attorneys may be uncomfortable, to say the
least, if their opposing counsel were able to click ‘undo’ to see the edit history of their client’s
document. The metadata in a typical Microsoft Word document may include: the author’s
name and initials, the name of the company or organization where the document was created,
the names of previous document authors, the original text and any revisions, template
information, digital comments, document versions, and hidden text.5
A competent attorney must understand how courts view metadata. The Southern
District of New York defines metadata as “electronically-stored evidence that describes the
‘history, tracking, or management of an electronic document.’”6 The courts have recognized
several distinct types of electronic metadata, including substantive metadata, system metadata,
and embedded metadata.7 Substantive metadata (sometimes referred to as “application”
metadata) is created as a function of the application software used to create the document or
file.8 This includes information that instructs the computer how to properly display properties
of a document such as the fonts, spacing, size, and color, as well as information that reflects
modifications to the document, such as its edit history.9 This information transfers with the
document because it is embedded in the file when it is moved or copied.10 A second category
1

of metadata is system metadata. System metadata “reflects information created by the user or
by the organization’s information management system.”11 This type of metadata is particularly
helpful when attempting to search and sort large numbers of documents efficiently—both in
the context of regular use and in e-discovery.12 A third category of metadata is embedded
metadata.13 Embedded metadata consists of “text, numbers, content, data, or other
information that is directly or indirectly imputed into a [n]ative [f]ile by a user and which is not
typically visible to the user viewing the output display” of the native file.14 This type of
metadata includes spreadsheet formulas, hidden columns, hyperlinks, references, and database
information.15 With this basic understanding of what metadata is, an attorney is prepared to
confront issues that may arise with its intentional or unintentional disclosure or discovery.
III.

Potential Pitfalls

Metadata is useful in document production. It was originally developed “by software
programmers accustomed to working in collaborative environments where sharing information
is commonplace.”16 Law firms also benefit from collaboration; in fact, Microsoft revealed in a
2001 press release that it solicited opinions from attorneys in developing Word 2002 because
“the legal profession must have an efficient way to compare documents and incorporate text
and formatting changes.”17 However, as much as the legal profession benefits from
collaboration, it stands to lose a lot if that information falls into the wrong hands.
Examples of metadata mishaps range from embarrassing to catastrophic. In February
2003, British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s office published a dossier on Iraq’s security and
intelligence organizations; this dossier was cited by Colin Powell in his address to the United
Nations.18 This dossier was published as a Microsoft Word document.19 The metadata from
the Word document revealed that, contrary to the government’s assertions, it had been drafted
by civilians and that parts of it had been plagiarized from a thesis written more than ten years
previously.20
Portable Document Format (PDF) files have less metadata and are frequently regarded
as safer from metadata mining than other file formats. While this is often the case, PDFs are
not foolproof. Attorneys at Facebook learned this lesson the hard way. In 2009, large portions
of the transcript of the settlement between Facebook and ConnectU were redacted and a PDF
of the transcript was made publicly available.21 While the image of the PDF had blacked-out
the redacted portions of the PDF, the metadata that provides the searchable text in a PDF was
not altered.22 Thus, members of the Associated Press were able to simply copy and paste the
sensitive information from the PDF.23 The metadata revealed that Facebook’s internal
valuation of the company was $3.7 billion, $8.88 per share.24 This was far less than the $15
billion valuation established by the Microsoft investment in 2007.25
While disclosing settlement terms is highly embarrassing (and likely a breach of a
confidentiality clause), active litigants have even more at stake. In 2004, the SCO group, an
entity that licenses and sells Unix, filed a complaint in state court against DaimlerChrysler and
AutoZone.26 The metadata gleaned from the court-filed documents revealed that SCO group’s
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attorneys had been building a case against Bank of America in federal court.27 In fact, the Word
document, when viewed under the “original showing markup” setting, identified Bank of
America as a defendant until exactly 11:10 a.m. on February 18.28
These examples have a few things in common. Each metadata leak was exposed by
members of the press who had no duty not to disclose this publicly shared information. Each
leak was found using rudimentary computer functions—Microsoft Word document settings and
copy-paste commands. Each metadata leak caused a scandal. But most importantly, each
metadata leak could have been prevented using basic metadata scrubbing procedures.
IV.

Ethical Issues

The attorneys from the examples in section III clearly did not intend to leak confidential
information through metadata, but these situations nevertheless raise various ethical issues.
First, the disclosure may amount to a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. Second, the
disclosure may amount to a waiver of work product protection. Third, while the above
examples of metadata leaks were all exposed by third parties, it is important to note that
opposing counsel that read inadvertently disclosed metadata may themselves be committing an
ethical violation.
The attorney-client privilege is among the oldest and most fundamental protections in
the American justice system.29 This privilege protects communication between attorneys and
clients in order to encourage full and frank communication between clients and their attorneys
and thus “promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of
justice.”30 The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers defines the test of qualifying
attorney-client communications as four elements: “(1) a communication (2) made between
privileged persons (3) in confidence (4) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal
assistance for the client.”31 It is well-settled law that this privilege belongs solely to the client.32
However, courts acknowledge that “the attorney’s conduct may bind the client even in the
absence of his express consent” if the attorney is acting under the authority granted to her as
agent.33
Implied waiver may occur when a client voluntarily discloses confidential
communications to a non-essential third party.34 Courts split into three distinct approaches
when it comes to determining whether the attorney-client privilege has been waived through
inadvertent disclosure.
The “Strict Approach” holds that inadvertent disclosure always waives the attorneyclient privilege. This approach, sometimes called the “Wigmorian approach”, the “strict-liability
approach”, or the “objective approach,” follows the teachings of Professor Wigmore, who
believed that all disclosures “are not protected by the privilege, on the principle that, since the
law has granted secrecy so far as its own process goes, it leaves it to the client and attorney to
take measures of caution sufficient to prevent [disclosure]. The risk of insufficient precautions is
upon the client.”35 The D.C. Circuit is among the courts that follow this approach.36 Proponents
of this approach believe that a uniform application to the waiver will prevent abuse of the duty
of confidentiality and encourage attorneys to take effective measures to prevent inadvertent
3

disclosures.37 Conversely, critics say that this approach is unduly harsh and intrudes upon the
attorney-client relationship because it may discourage clients from confiding in their attorney.38
Furthermore, the Wigmorian view was devised in an age before liberal discovery practices and
may be an impractical approach to today’s high-volume document disclosures.
The “Lenient Approach” (also referred to as the intent-based approach) requires intent
to disclose privileged material and fully protects from inadvertent disclosure.39 Courts that
follow this approach, including Federal courts in Florida and Illinois, reason that since waiver is
often defined as “[t]he voluntary relinquishment or abandonment—express or implied—of a
legal right or advantage,”40 it is not possible to waive the privilege inadvertently.41 Proponents
of this approach argue that this rule protects clients from their attorneys’ negligence. This
reflects the concept that the privilege belongs solely to the client. Like the Strict Approach, this
approach also has the benefits of a uniform application and easy administration.42 However,
critics of the Lenient Approach argue that this approach ignores the basic principles of agency
law and leaves little incentive for attorneys to guard privileged information.43
The third and most common approach, adopted by a majority of jurisdictions, is the
Circumstances Approach—which, predictably, finds a middle ground between the Strict
Approach and the Lenient Approach.44 Courts that follow this approach examine all of the
circumstances surrounding the inadvertent disclosure and allow waiver in only limited
circumstances, such as when an attorney or client “fail[s] to take reasonable steps to maintain
confidentiality.”45 Courts examine five factors to determine if the privilege is waived: “(1) the
reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure in view of the extent
of the document production; (2) the number of inadvertent disclosures; (3) the extent of the
disclosure; (4) the promptness of measures taken to rectify the disclosure; and (5) whether the
overriding interests of justice would or would not be served by relieving the party of its
error.”46 Unsurprisingly, the gains in flexibility and fairness by adopting this approach cost
some efficiency and predictability that go along with the uniform approaches. The bottom line
for an attorney in entrusted with confidential client information is to know your jurisdiction and
act reasonably and competently.
The work product doctrine, codified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3),47
provides “qualified immunity for materials prepared in anticipation of litigation by a party, an
attorney, or some other representative of a party.”48 When confronted with the issue of work
product protection, nearly all jurisdictions follow a similar approach to the Circumstances
Approach from the Attorney-Client Privilege jurisprudence.49 Courts weigh the following five
factors to determine whether a waiver has occurred: “(1) reasonableness of precautions taken
to prevent disclosure, (2) time taken to rectify error, (3) scope of discovery, (4) extent of
disclosure, and (5) overriding issues of fairness.”50
An attorney who receives inadvertently disclosed privileged information is faced with
conflicting ethical obligations: they have both a duty to diligently represent their client and a
duty to avoid dishonestly, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.51 This dilemma was addressed in
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2002 by the Model Rule 4.4(b), which directs the receiving attorney to promptly notify the
sender.52
V.

Evidentiary Issues

Metadata is an unsettled frontier in e-discovery and full treatment of the subject is well
beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, attorneys must understand the rules, or they risk
sanctions for evidence spoliation or even criminal charges for destruction of evidence.53 The
watershed case on the subject, Williams v. Sprint/United Management Co., held that a
defendant who produces electronic files during discovery must also produce their
corresponding metadata.54 Three years after Williams, the Southern District of New York
clarified some of the requirements for various types of metadata production in e-discovery.55
Substantive metadata, which includes information such as prior edit history, editorial
comments, and computer display instructions, “need not be routinely produced” unless the
requesting party shows good cause.56 System metadata, such as information about the author,
date of creation, and date of modification are frequently considered irrelevant by courts.57
System metadata may be relevant, however, if the authenticity of a document is questioned or
dates of document creation are important to the case.58 Embedded metadata, such as
formulae in complicated spreadsheets, is “generally discoverable” and “should be produced as
a matter of course.”59 Importantly, the destruction of metadata can land a client and attorney
in trouble for spoliation of evidence.60
VI.

Conclusion and Best Practices

As professionals entrusted with privileged client information and sophisticated data
management responsibilities, it is imperative that new and experienced attorneys alike become
familiar with the dangers of inadvertent metadata disclosure and evidence spoliation from the
irresponsible destruction of metadata. This is a fine line that attorneys must walk. The most
important thing to remember is that the moment a client is on notice of the pending litigation,
metadata must be preserved with their corresponding electronic documents.61 At no point,
however, should an attorney ever send a document with work product metadata. The best
practice is to use metadata scrubbing software to ensure that outgoing documents and files
that are sent to opposing counsel, third parties, or e-filed with a court are sent without
potentially damaging metadata. Large firms typically have this kind of software integrated into
their data management systems. Small firms and solo practitioners can purchase relatively
inexpensive software programs that will remove metadata from outgoing documents and files.
These software programs are extremely effective and are part of a responsible and reasonable
effort to protect privileged information from inadvertent disclosure. In closing, all attorneys
would be wise to heed John Kinas’s [and Lady Macbeth’s paraphrased] advice: “Scrub early, and
scrub often.”62
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